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CHAPTER SIX 
COMPARING RELIGIOUS IDEAS: THERE'S METHOD IN 
THE MOB'S MADNESS 
Wesley J. Wildman 
Methodological wrangling over simple tasks is a waste of time; it is 
better just to get on with the work at hand. If reflection on method 
in relation to the task of comparing religious ideas has value, it is 
because comparing religious ideas is an important and complex task. 
Self-conscious debate about comparative method ought to be useful 
because there is confusion and fierce debate about the primary task, 
from how best to do it to whether to attempt the task at all. 
This essay surveys a number of attitudes and approaches to com- 
parison in the study of religion. One of these was developed in the 
Crosscultural Comparative Religious Ideas Project (CRIP), a Boston- 
based research effort running from 1995-1999. Under the leadership 
of Robert Neville, CRIP brought together six tradition specialists (Frank 
Clooney, David Eckel, Paula Fredriksen, Noman al Haq, Livia Kohn, 
Anthony Saldarini) and four comparative generalists (Peter Berger, 
John Berthrong, Robert Neville, Wesley Wildman), as well as a num- 
ber of graduate students. The double aim was to test a methodol- 
ogy for comparing religious ideas by actually using it to make 
comparisons, and to explore a small-community-based pedagogical 
approach to the formation of potential future experts in compara- 
tive religion. The project produced three volumes of results that 
appeared in 200 1 entitled Ultimate Realities, The Human Condition, and 
Rel@us Truth.' 
' Neville, ed., Ultimate Realities. This essay is a significantly revised and expanded 
version of ch. 9 of Ultimate Realities. I owe a great deal to other members of CRIP, 
but especially to Robert Neville, with whom I collaborated closely throughout the 
project, co-writing many chapters, including the one profoundly revised here. Though 
I was first author on the original chapter and Neville's contributions were minor, 
it is impossible to overstate his influence on the way I understand comparison of 
My purpose here is to join the ongoing conversation over com- 
parative method by showing how the CRIP approach relates to oth- 
ers. I shall make a three-fold case on behalf of this view of comparison. 
First, I shall indicate how it draws on the strengths of existing 
approaches. Second, I shall identify a pervasive weakness in extant 
approaches to comparison of-religious ideas and show how the CRIP 
approach overcomes it. Third, I shall show how the CRIP proposal 
answers the challenges issued by various comparativists, including 
Jonathan Z. Smith in a famous article analyzing approaches to com- 
par i~on .~  It follows that this essay is not only a survey of approaches 
to comparison but also an argument for the particular method for 
comparing religious ideas that the CRIP used in its re~earch.~ 
The organization of the essay expresses its argumentative charac- 
ter. I classify a number of attitudes and approaches to comparison 
according to how they would answer an increasingly detailed sequence 
of questions. Some reject the possibility of comparison whereas I 
argue for its possibility. Others reject explicit categories for com- 
parison whereas I argue that explicitness about the inevitability of 
comparison in categories (or respects) is a virtue overall. Still others 
justify categories from existing theories whereas I argue for limiting 
(not eliminating) this kind of justification in order to make categories 
more vulnerable to correction and more easily able to change in 
response to the process of comparison. And yet others justify cate- 
gories directly from similarities in the data whereas I argue, with 
Smith, that this is too arbitrary a procedure. 
The CRIP view, by contrast, is that there should be a dialectic 
between data and comparative categories whereby the task of under- 
standing through comparison can build progressively on previous 
results. Categories can come from anywhere so long as a dialectical 
process of improvement and correction is in place. Justification of 
religions. In particular, the seeds of the CRIP approach to comparison were planted 
in Neville's earlier works, especially Nonnative Cultures. Neville has given his permis- 
sion for me to rethink and rewrite the original chapter; I take full responsibility for 
the result. 
Smith, "In Comparison a Magic Dwells," The paper was initially presented to 
the History of Judaism section of the American Academy of Religion, 1979. 
There are many useful surveys to which those seeking more comprehensive and 
less quarrelsome coverage can turn. Other ways of summarizing approaches to the 
study of religion and the comparison of religious ideas include Sharpe, Cornparalive 
Religion; Ringgren, "Combarative Mythology," Smart, "Comparative-Historical 
Method"; Tracy, "Theology: Comparative Theology"; Capps, Religious Studies; and 
Clooney, Seeing through Texts. 
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comparative categories is a complex process depending both on data 
identified and described and on theories in which the categories get 
meaning by playing key roles. The CRIP approach presupposes a 
corporate effort to make and improve comparisons, to assemble and 
analyze data, and to root out bias and short-sightedness. It eschews 
exclusive reliance on the genius insights of brilliant comparativists 
and instead builds these into a wider and messier corporate approach 
that includes ordinary scholars as well as the occasional compara- 
tive genius. It is a method for the mob. It may seem untidy but, 
like the natural and social sciences, it may be able to achieve results 
where nothing else can. The requirement of a community of inquiry 
that can stabilize hypotheses for investigation lies at the heart of the 
pedagogical significance of the GRIP approach. 
I begin by discussing comparison in general terms and describing 
the CRIP approach in more detail. The bulk of the paper analyzes 
alternative views of comparison. In the penultimate section, I review 
the aforementioned argument of Smith and show how the CRIP 
approach to comparison, though it may have weaknesses all its own, 
does not fall prey to the criticisms he rightly levels against extant 
approaches. I conclude with some reflections on the pedagogical 
implications of this approach to comparison. 
Comparison is controversial when it reaches across cultures, lan- 
guages, religions, worldviews, and forms of life. I venture a general 
discussion of this topic in an attempt to establish a relatively non- 
controversial basis for the subsequent discussion of strategies for com- 
paring religions, and specifically religious ideas. 
What is comparison? The Oxford English Dictionary's online 
definitions for the transitive verb "compare" are: (1) "To speak of 
or represent as similar; to liken"; and (2) "To mark or point out the 
similarities and differences of (two or more things); to bring or place 
together (actually or mentally) for the purpose of noting the simi- 
larities and differences." Both definitions are relevant to most kinds 
of comparison. We usually begin by noticing that two things are 
curiously alike and then we proceed to examine them closely, noting 
similarities and differences. To  "bring or place together for the pur- 
pose of noting the similarities and differences" is in effect to invoke 
and impose a respect of comparison on the cognitive process. We 
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usually compare in respects that interest us, often neglecting respects 
that do not. The respect in which we compare constitutes a com- 
parative category for the comparison. 
A prosaic example may be in order. When we seek to compare 
oranges and apples in respect of being fruit, we\use 'Lfruit" as a com- 
parative category. As fruit, apples and oranges 'are similar in some 
respects and different in others; these more specific respects of com- 
parison are subordinate comparative categories. In respect of surface 
texture, oranges are dimpled whereas apples are smooth; in respect 
of rind qualities, most oranges have a thick and fleshy rind while 
apple rinds are thin, and both are slightly bitter; in respect of inter- 
nal structure, oranges are segmented and apples are not but both 
carry seeds in a segmented arrangement. The respects of compari- 
son thus define a complex array of categories, some subordinate to 
others, and each the basis for noting similarities and differences. 
Every comparative category must be vague in order to register 
differences. Vagueness here does not mean perverse refusal to be 
specific. Rather, vagueness refers to a logical characteristic of a cat- 
egory, namely, that the law of non-contradiction does not apply to 
what falls within it. For example, the comparative category of "fruit 
rind" must be vague to accommodate the quite different cases of 
apples, oranges, watermelon, avocados, and kiwi fruit. Propositions 
expressing the characteristics of fruit rinds-"Fruit rinds are thi5k 
and smooth" versus "Fruit rinds are thin and furry," for example- 
specifji the category of "fruit rind" in ways that seem to contradict 
but in fact do not contradict because of the vagueness of the cate- 
gory "fruit rind." The vague category is a meaningful basis for com- 
parison and the many possible specifications of it fill out its content. 
To say this is not yet to say that the comparative category is usehl 
or interesting. In fact, I selected a mundane category just to make the 
point that we must distinguish the logical analysis of the vagueness 
of a category from judgments about whether a vague category helps 
to detect anything interesting about important subject matters, such 
as religion. 
All comparison is interested, because it is the act of interpreting 
beings. We usually are unaware of our interests, which is why meet- 
ing people with different interests can be so entertaining or dis- 
turbing: encountering the other heightens our awareness of our own 
particularities. We compare apples and oranges in respect of health 
benefits, cost, ease of production in a local climate, seasonal demand, 
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shelf life, flavor, and what our kids will eat. We shift with ease among 
these various respects of comparison as our interests dictate and we 
think little of it because nothing of intellectual or moral significance 
seems to be at stake. But this is not always so; sometimes important 
moral or intellectual issues are at stake in the comparisons we make. 
The vagueness and interestedness of comparative categories can 
combine in unexpected ways to produce bad comparisons. Specifically, 
we conceive categories poorly (a) when they lead to uninteresting 
comparisons, @) when we fail to make them vague in just the right 
ways to accommodate the things we are interested in comparing, or 
(c) when they depend on mistaken theories about aspects of reality. 
I will give examples of all of these in what follows. 
(a) "Rind texture" is vague in just the right way to handle the 
varied surface characteristics of fruit, but it is not especially inter- 
esting in isolation from some theoretical account of why fruits have 
rinds and why the rinds vary in character. "Large-scale segmenta- 
tion" is not much use as a comparative category if we are interested 
in comparing apples and oranges because the category only succeeds 
in registering apples negatively, as not having any large-scale seg- 
mentation. In fact, if we are not properly attentive, we may-con- 
clude that apples have no segmentation at all because they do not 
have the segmentation we see in tangerines and oranges, and our 
attention is focused only on large-scale segmentation. If we were to 
consider the broader category of "segmentation," we might happily 
make comparisons between apples and oranges with respect to sev- 
eral different kinds of segmentation (large-scale, sub-structure scale, 
seed-scale, surface bump patterns, etc.) We handle vagueness of the 
"segmentation" category by specifying subordinate categories to flesh 
out the dimensions of meaning of segmentation that the data demand. 
(b) There is nothing inherently wrong with comparative categories 
lacking the ideal level of vagueness. But two practical problems can 
arise, especial1y;when we unthinkingly adopt existing categories for 
new purposes. On the one hand, too much vagueness gives undue 
freedom to our overactive pattern-recognition skills, permitting us to 
see simiiarities and differences that suit our interests, whether or not 
those interests are ideologically innocent. Thus, sometimes it may 
suit us to compare apples and oranges in respect of their reminding 
us of glorious summer holidays in the south of France. Far less inno- 
cent comparisons of the same sort are possible, though perhaps not 
in the domain of fruit. On the other hand, our comparisons can 
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lack richness and insight when we use insufficiently vague categories 
to describe ill-suited subject matter. Consider again the comparative 
category of "segmented fruit structure," for example. This category 
must be vague to allow for the segmented macro structure of tan- 
gerines, the segmented seed casings of apples, the fact that some 
apples have minor large structure segmentation (in the form of bumps 
at the bottom of the apple) and others do not, the symmetry of 
peaches and nectarines, and the fact that some oranges have deli- 
cate internal substructures and others do not. If we unconsciously 
understand the comparative category of segmentation to refer only 
to comprehensive macro-structural segmentation, then our compar- 
ative category may lead us to overlook other types of segmentation 
in fruit, as when the claim that "Oranges are segmented but apples 
are not" leads us to overlook segmentation of the apple core. 
Consciousness of this problem is the first step in avoiding distorted 
descriptions of segmentation in apples. The most useful strategy is' 
to develop an array of categories within which broader categories 
are specified by subordinate categories. This leads us to look foh sub- 
tle features. It is precisely for this reason that classification schemes 
have been so important in the history of t h ~ u g h t . ~  While promot- 
ing more detailed observation, however, classification schemes also 
carry hidden theoretical assumptions about which we must strive to 
be aware lest distortion of description and flawed understanding go 
~nnoticed.~ Thus, one of the tricks in improving comparisons is to 
allow the details of the process of comparing to make us conscious 
of narrowness in our comparative categories, whereafter we can either 
narrow the definition of a comparative category to conform to the 
way we were using it or broaden the definition to accommodate the 
features of the data that interest us. In either case, the categories of 
comparison are responsive to the process of comparison. 
I 
Witness the impact of Carl Linnaeus's famous taxonomy of animals and plants. 
The first edition of Linnaeus's taxonomy, Systema Naturae, was published in 1735 
and it subsequently went into many editions, growing from a slender pamphlet to 
a multi-volume work. It is still in use today, though with many changes and expan- 
sions. This is but one example of the many taxonomies and classifications in use 
our age, from product catalogues to types of religion. 
The criticisms of Linnaeus' taxonomy are legion but the deepest problems with 
the taxonomy arise when morphological similarity makes organisms seem related 
yet genomic information suggest evolutionary distance, thereby clouding the very 
concept of species, which is one of the most crucial comparative categories of the 
classification. 
COMPARING RELIGIOUS IDEAS 8 3 
(c) Some comparisons are invidious and lead to intellectual mis- 
understandings and moral disasters. When Aristotle compared human 
beings in respect of the independence and completeness of intellec- 
tive soul, he concluded that slaves had none of these qualities and 
that women require a man's fully developed intellective soul to guide 
and complete their own partidy developed intellective soul.6 Aristotle 
seems unaware of his powerful desire to rationalize existing social 
practices, yet his comparison reflects this interest in a way that is 
obvious to people with different interests (such as Plato7) and still 
more obvious to people who live at a time when better data makes 
Aristotle's comparison seem silly, despite the fact that it was gener- 
ous for its time in some ways (not everyone clearly distinguished 
women from slaves, as Aristotle did). 
Where precisely does the problem with Aristotle's comparison lie? 
The mistake is in the meaning he gives to the comparative category 
by which he attempts to diagnose similarities and differences among 
men, women, and slaves, namely, the independence and complete- 
ness of intellective soul. The meaning of this category derives from 
mostly mistaken theories about human nature, the intellect, and 
human reproduction, and from ~ o s t l y  mistaken estimates of the 
power of social context to condifion interpretations. Aristotle was 
empirically minded enough to recognize that some women did not 
fit his model but treated them as "contrary to nature" exceptions 
rather than as the few women able to break through oppressive social 
circumstances to realize some of their intellectual power despite the 
almost insurmountable difficulties they faced. And Aristotle was just 
wrong about reproduction, as when he speculated that women had 
to be incomplete men because their bodies were unable to heat 
menstrual fluid to the point that it could become semen. Of course, 
he thought that semen was the source of the non-material parts of 
a human being, including especially intellective soul. The theoreti- 
cal framework for his comparative category of "the independence 
and completeness of intellective soul" was defective and we are enti- 
tled to wonder whether he did enough to test and improve the 
category. 
See Aristotle, PhyslGa 1252b; Generation ofAnimals, I 728a (Loeb Classical Library). 
' See Plato's Republic, in which Plato allows women a role in the ruling class. 
But in 7imaeus 90e, the best that women can hope for in the process of rebirth is 
to become a man. 
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The lesson here is that special interests interfere with the refinement 
of comparative categories. Interested comparison is inevitable but 
bad interested comparison is not. We can control for interests by 
seeking correction and refinement of our comparative categories. We 
can strive both to make them sensitive to the variations in the data 
for comparison (as when we have to avoid unconscious rigidity in 
our understanding of segmentation in fruit) and to give them mean- 
ing through embedding them in superior theoretical frameworks (as 
when we have to have accurate theories of reproduction if we are 
to avoid Aristotle's mistakes in wielding the category of the inde- 
pendence and completeness of intellective soul). 
This discussion of interested comparison drives home the some- 
times-overlooked fact that behind every act of comparison there lurks 
an interpreter with only partially conscious interests, incomplete 
knowledge of the world, and an enormous capacity for making del- 
icate discriminations to suit ruling interests, to rationalize desired 
actions, and to bring comfort and assurance that the "other" is com- 
prehensible and controllable rather than terrifjlng. The neurological 
conditions for comparison are important here. Human beings have 
highly developed pattern recognition skills, which are especially use- 
ful for recognizing the significance of facial  expression^.^ These skills 
misfire from time to time in interpreting faces. 'They also lead us to 
expect patterns where none exist, or at least none at the level we 
seek. This is one of the great liabilities that human beings bring to 
observation and inquiry, and psychologists have documented its effects 
\ in great detail.q It is equally a liability in comparison, where untrained 
human beings are too ready to find similarities on the basis of a 
quick glance. This maximizes vulnerability to error due to over- 
confidence, and marginalizes the careful observation and analysis of 
theoretical frameworks that we need to save comparative conclusions 
from becoming victims of casual hubris borne of over-active pattern- 
recognition skills. 
To summarize, comparison is a cognitive activity that involves 
See Brothers, Friday's Footprint. 
There are many compendiums of errors due to biological limitations on human 
rationality and overactive pattern recognition, including examples of the ways that 
unscrupulous people exploit such vulnerabilities for their own profit and amusement. 
See, for example, Gilovich, How We Know Wuzt Isn't So; Piatelli-Palmarini, Ineuitable 
Illusions; Plous, P ~ c h o h ~  oflujrucienent; Randi, Flim Flam; Sagan, 7he Demon-Haunted 
World; Shermer, Why People Belime Weird nings. 
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construing multiple things as instances of a vague comparative cat- 
egory. Good comparison works (a) empirically by keying categorical 
vagueness to comparative data, (b) conservatively by allowing for 
over-active human pattern recognition skills, (c) theoretically by attend- 
ing to the way categories derive their meaning from existing inter- 
pretations of aspects of reality, and (d) humbly by seeking correction of 
comparative hypotheses in light of changing observations and theories. 
To explain the CRIP approach to comparison in more detail, we 
need t i  move beyond this basic understanding of comparison, and 
of what makes comparison good. In particular, we need to shift the 
focus to religion rather than the banal topic of fruit. The CRIP 
approach to comparing religious ideas has several  characteristic^.'^ 
First, the CRIP approach is focused on religious ideas, rather than 
religious practices or religions in general. Focusing on ideas is not 
as limiting as it may seem at first since even religious practices are 
available for comparison as ideas when they are described verbally 
and framed theoretically. In fact, comparing practices in isolation 
from the ideas that make them important and relevant to people is 
probably futile. The point of focusing on ideas is to keep elements 
of interpretation in the comparative picture. Comparative categories 
derive their meaning from theoretical interpretations of aspects of 
religion and the comparative venture collapses into mere impres- 
sionism if we pretend that comparative categories somehow appear 
from nowhere, contextless and free of the distortions of history and 
the colorings of interpretation. When texts do not exist to document 
aspects of the meaning of religious beliefs and practices, as is the 
case for many modern tribal religions, cultural anthropologists and 
other observers of these religions must create interpretations of what 
they see to guide subsequent comparison. 
Second, the CRIP approach is committed to a particular inter- 
pretation of the history of comparative categories. Many compara- 
tive categories owe their origins to translation decisions about how 
Perhaps the most compelling account of the CRIP approach to comparing 
religious ideas is Neville and Wildrnan, "On Comparing Religious Ideas". 
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to render in European languages key terms in the sacred texts of 
the world's religions. From there, those categories have had a huge 
impact on subsequent discussions-and not just explicit comparisons. 
Even apparently neutral description makes use of available termi- 
nology and so is inherently comparative in nature. When some activ- 
ity is identified as a ritual, some person as a priest, some place as 
sacred, or some time as propitious, the descriptions presuppose com- 
parative judgments. The comparative categories of "ritual," "priest," 
"sacred place," and "propitious time" are stretched in these new 
usages a i d  they also lead interpreters and subsequent readers of 
these descriptions to interpret the things described in terms of exist- 
ing patterns of usage of the key categories. Comparison suffuses 
description and thus the only way forward even for description is to 
take responsibility for comparative judgments wherever they arise. 
Third, the CRIP approach proposes that taking responsibility for 
a comparative judgment involves explicitly thematizing the category 
involved, subjecting it to scrutiny regarding its origins and existing 
usages, examining the theoretical frameworks that give it meaning, 
and testing to see whether it leads to distorted readings of the things 
described by means of it. In other words, comparative judgments 
are inevitable so we must create a process whereby we can correct 
comparative judgments and the categories they involve. 
Fourth, this commitment to constant correction and improvement 
requires us to treat comparative judgments as fallible hypotheses, not 
indubitable propositions. Moreover, this commitment to correction, 
while freeing us to work with comparative categories regardless of 
their convoluted histories, leads us to be suspicious of all compara- 
tive categories and to look for the three problems identified above: 
categories suffering from theoretically suspect framing, categories 
insufficiently vague to avoid distortion, and categories so vague that 
there is insufficient resistance to our tendency to form hasty impres- 
sions of similarity. 
Fifth, the CRIP approach assumes that comparisons aim td be 
true, in the dyadic sense that locates the truth or falsity of a propo- 
sition in the accuracy of interpretation of its subject matter. Famously 
hidden within this apparently simple dyadic understanding of the 
meaning of truth is the far more complex process of interpretation 
that associates a claim with a subject matter in a particular respect, and 
locates the act of interpretation itself in a concrete social and polit- 
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ical situation. It follows that we must evaluate the truth of a propo- 
sition expressing a comparative judgment in relation to the way the 
respect of interpretation-the comparative category-forges a link 
between comparative judgment and subject matter. And we must 
concern ourselves with the effects of comparing religions because 
comparison inevitably is a socially and politically contextualized act 
of interpretation. 
Sixth, the CRIP approach proposes that justifying comparative 
categories begins with using the category to describe and compare 
religious ideas fairly, where fairness is judged by the standard that 
Wilfrid Cantwell Smith so ably defended: "qualified adherent ap- 
proval." But the CRIP approach also involves taking responsibility for 
the fact that a category derives its meaning from large-scale theories 
of the subject matter. That is, a category such as "ultimate reality" is 
not just an empty vessel that we say contains other ideas such as 
Allah, Brahman, Chance, Dao, Emptiness, Form, or God. Ultimate 
reality is itself an idea with meaning that derives from the various 
ways it is specified in comparisons and by theories that explain how 
these various specifications are related to one another (in Max Weber 
or Paul Tillich, for example). Some comparativists balk at entering 
the theoretical territory limned here but I think it is futile trying to 
avoid theoretically loaded comparative categories. The most prudent 
course of action is to make these theories explicit and to seek to refine 
them as opportunity allows. I shall discuss in more detail later how 
to manage the theoretical elements of justifying comparative categories. 
Finally, the CRIP approach achieves objectivity and accuracy in 
comparison not by trying to avoid the many hermeneutical difficulties 
of comparison but rather by embracing them as inevitable and seek- 
ing, indeed constructing, a procedure whereby we can locate mis- 
takes, overcome distortions, and improve the theoretical frameworks 
underlying comparisons. In this sense-here at last I offer a com- 
pact definition-the CRIP method is a dialectic of theory and data 
sustained within a large-scale social process devoted to the discov- 
ery, improvement, and correction of comparative hypotheses. 
The sequence of questions by which I survey the field and promote 
the CRIP approach begins with the basic one reflecting the con- 
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tention surrounding comparison in contemporary religious studies: Is 
comparison possible? If we take this question in its narrowest sense, 
as asking about the sheer possibility of comparison of religious ideas 
and practices, it is unproblematic. I think it undeniable that com- 
parison has actually occurred, whether well or badly done. 
The question is more interesting if understood as a question about 
the possibility of successful comparison. The ideal of "success" is 
contested but I think the discussion above reflects most people's hopes 
for what success should mean: allowing for over-active human imag- 
ination, minimizing the effects of biased interests, identifying impor- 
tant features of the things compared, and winning approval of 
descriptions from qualified adherents, where "qualified" means experts 
trained in the disciplines of comparison. To this I would add the 
meta-constraint that the purpose of making comparisons should be 
morally legitimate. Understanding success in this five-fold way, I con- 
tend that relative success in comparing religious ideas is possible, at 
least some of the time. The views denying the possibility of suc- 
cessful comparison1' do so in at least the following three ways. 
First, some are so impressed by the differences between cultures 
and religions that they speak of incommensurability and deny the 
meaningfulness of talk about vague categories that express common 
respects of comparison. Even when common respects of comparison 
seem to be present, these critics insist, we cannot assure ourselves 
that real commonality exists because intricate cultural embedding 
makes the ideas involved incommensurable. To this "incommensu- 
rability objection" my answer is three-fold. (a) The biological structure 
of human life places a limit on the problem of cultural impenetrability 
and gives a solid basis for speaking of common features of hu- 
man culture. (b) The phenomenon of multiple religious and per- 
sonal identity (for instance Confucian Christians, Jewish Buddhists) 
shows that the claim of incommensurability is strained. (c) What is 
difficult to communicate or translate at one time and place may not 
be so always and everywhere because language and culture are 
mutable, dynamic phenomena. To say that comparison is a social 
and political act is precisely to allow that it can change circum- 
stances, including by creating previously non-existent possibilities 
I '  For example see Wiebe, Religion and Truth; Bqond Legitimation. 
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of communication and crosscultural understanding. These three 
considerations do not automatically assure the meanin,fulness of 
speaking about common respects of comparison but they do check 
objections that would arrest from the outset all attempts to identify 
meaningful respects of comparison. Once the comparative process 
has begun, at least on the CRIP understanding of that process, the 
existence or creation of common respects of comparison is largely 
an empirical matter. 
Second, some are so impressed by the human tendency to become 
attached to familiar ways of interpreting the world that they view 
the problem of bias as intractable. They deny that we can treat reli- 
gious practices, texts, and traditions as specifications of comparative 
categories without fatal distortion, no matter what pains are taken 
to be fair. Perhaps we can imagine creatures capable of fair inter- 
pretation through being less thoroughly indebted to biologically con- 
gealed habits of understanding than human beings are. But we cannot 
imagine ourselves capable of overcoming the limitations of imagi- 
nation and perspective that plague our attempts to be fair-minded 
in human affairs. My reply to this "bias objection" turns on a differ- 
ence in judgment regarding the degree to which bias is problematic. 
I take the existence of adaptable forms of inquiry such as the natural 
sciences to be evidence that people are capable of establishing so- 
cial arrangements wherein vulnerability and improvement of inter- 
pretations is prized. Moreover, the "qualified adherent approval test," 
in spite of its complexities, assures us that our efforts to be fair 
are sometimes relatively successful. Once again, however, nothing 
in this reply guarantees fairness, nor even a recipe for achieving it. 
Fair interpretation is an art form in which success turns on skill and 
effort as well as a clear-headed method. 
Third, some might grant the meaningfulness of respects of com- 
parison and even the possibility of making allowance for bias, yet 
view the purpose of comparison as essentially immoral, thus making 
successful comparison impossible where "success" connotes worthi- 
ness. Whether the goal of comparison is to satisfy curiosity, to enhance 
understanding, to build theories, or something else, the "morality 
objection" insists that comparison is an exercise of cultural power 
for which it is hard to take full and fair responsibility. If not a bla- 
tant exertion of cultural force, then it is at the very least a danger- 
ous form of transformative praxis: comparison changes things, both 
the things compared and those making the comparisons. My reply 
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to the morality objection begins by granting that comparison is inter- 
ested and transformative praxis. Indeed, the very purpose of com- 
parison in the social context of interreligious dialogue is to bring 
about cultural and personal change through mutual understanding. 
I think that purposes in making comparisons or religious ideas are 
often and perhaps usually morally legitimate. There are no guaran- 
tees, however, for moral judgments of this kind change with time 
and place. I have no trouble imagining settings in which curiosity 
should be checked and understanding sacrificed for the sake of some 
relatively higher moral purpose, such as the protection from scrutiny 
of an exquisite and fragile cultural phenomenon. 
The incommensurability, bias, and morality objections to the pos- 
sibility of successful comparison are potent. My reply in each case 
turns heavily not only on the conception of comparison I am defend- 
ing but also on the social process of comparison that plays an essen- 
tial role in making corrections and adjustments in comparative 
judgments. My resistance to non-empirical pronouncements about 
what is possible and what is impossible in comparison makes sense 
only in the context of a serious positive viewpoint that moves beyond 
hopeful speculation about comparative method. That alternative is 
a properly empirical procedure that prizes vulnerability of compar- 
ative hypotheses and actively seeks to improve them in as many ways 
and with as much diligence as possible. This is the CRIP approach. 
Positions answering the question of possibility in the affirmative can 
be differentiated by their responses to a second question: To what 
extent should comparison proceed as an explicitly cognitive process 
with the results of comparison represented as (hypothetical) ideas? 
The argument that an act of comparison presupposes a respect of 
comparison (a category) is sound; it is simply a part of the gram- 
mar of comparison that two things are similar or different s o m e h o w  
and the how is the respect or category of comparison. Nevertheless, 
comparisons of religious ideas sometimes avoid any explicit mention 
of the operative categories. This may be because of lack of interest 
or because of inconsistency, which would be serious defects. This 
silence also may serve a constructive goal: resistance to making the 
act of comparison an explicit cognitive process. To suppress discus- 
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sion of the category of comparison while still making comparisons 
is effectively to leave the results and categories of comparison implicit 
in the comparative act itself. 
There are at least two reasons why this goal sometimes seems 
important. First, if we view knowledge as an event of illumination 
within a dynamic process, we might feel averse rather than drawn 
to explicit hypotheses about religions voiced explicitly in terms of 
comparative categories. Rather, proper knowledge is attained when 
the results involve a seeing-as with potentidy transformative effects. 
Second, refusing to make the results of comparison explicit in the 
form of clear hypotheses is a hedge against so-called logocentrism. 
Vigilantly deconstructing comparative conclusions as fast as they 
materialize keeps the mind agile, avoids the ironic trapping of the- 
orists by their own comparative conclusions, and most adequately 
respects differences among traditions. Some theorists deem these 
virtues so important that they willingly forsake the rather different 
virtues of self-consciousness of procedure, vulnerability to correction, 
and detection of bias that pertain to acts of comparison structured 
as explicit cognitive processes along CRIP lines. 
There are a number of examples of this reticent approach to com- 
parison. They vary in the degree to which they oppose representa- 
tion of comparison as an explicit cognitive process and of comparative 
conclusions as ideas but they uniformly insist on the value of com- 
parison in absence of a cognitive representation of the results as a 
third thing. Such approaches may use respects of comparison drawn 
from narrative structures12 or metaphors.13 Alternatively, they may 
juxtapose points of view14 or facilitate intellectually illuminating play 
across differences.15 These approaches avoid large-scale theories about 
categories of comparison (such as the human condition, ultimate real- 
ities, or religious truth). Moreover, they tend to be suspicious of 
accounts of causal factors that purport to explain conceptual simi- 
larities between traditions or texts.16 The suspicion is understandable: 
l 2  Doniger, Women, Andro~nes, and Other Mythical Beash; Dreams, Illusion and Other 
Realities. 
l 3  Eckel, To See the Buddha. 
Clooney, 7heology a& kdantu; "Comparative Theology," 521-550. 
l 5  Smith, Imw.ning Religion; Smith, Map ir Not Temmtory. 
l6 See Ultimate Realities, ch. 8 ,  where such causal explanations appear. 
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theories about comparative categories and causal analyses tend to be 
seriously underdetermined by the comparative data. 
I have some sympathy for these indirect approaches to compari- 
son. They highlight a genuine weakness, albeit one that fades with 
time (I hope), in the CRIP approach to comparison. These views 
hold in common that successful comparison is a moment of genius 
insight in which an illuminating similarity is grasped intuitively and 
then expressed gracefully, avoiding the unattractive mistake of smoth- 
ering the insights with an unwieldy theoretical apparatus. Almost any 
broad theoretical framework either will be too abstract to explain 
anything or will quickly predict not only the insight under investi- 
gation but a horde of other comparative conclusions as well. In fact, 
it will predict so much on the basis of such slender data that the 
theory will collapse under the weight of its own pretensions. A the- 
ory about a comparative category is, on these views, drastically under- 
determined by the data, and thus extensively stipulates what ought 
to be the case, invariably getting too much wrong to be attractive. 
Making comparison into an explicit cognitive process with a dialec- 
tical methodology of vulnerability, debate, and improvement seems 
too facile, too unrealistic about the complex data to be accounted 
for in comparisons, and too optimistic about the power of theories 
to coordinate the disparate data consistently. What is left for com- 
parison, then, except to be the domain of genius insight? And what 
is the point of rendering comparison an explicit cognitive process 
except boldly to hide from the fact that we simply cannot regulate 
comparative efforts in the way the CRIP approach claims is possible? 
Note how modest is the objection to the CRIP approach that I 
infer fiom these viewpoints. It does not claim that successful com- 
parison is impossible on a prion grounds. Rather, it plausibly argues 
that a slender base of comparative data about religious phenomena 
and a worrying history of distortion and arbitrariness in previous 
comparative efforts combine with the irreducible complexity of the 
task to make the safest approach one of avoiding too formalized and 
aggressive an approach to comparison. Leave it to those deeply ini- 
tiated into several traditions. Let us be content with their moments 
of illumination and the comparative insights they produce. Let us 
avoid systematization and cognitive fretting. It's just not worth it. 
The relationship between this view and the CRIP view resembles 
the relationship between Mahayana and Theravada sensibilities in 
Buddhism. In Theravada, the focused journey toward enlightenment 
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is for the monks, for the genius experts. In Mahayana, enlighten- 
ment is for the masses; not being genius experts, however, they must 
find ways to work together. In the same way, I am urging that the 
process of comparison should be made more public, that many kinds 
of people should combine forces to search for stable comparative 
hypotheses, and that the key to this approach is an explicit method. 
This method must prize stability and vulnerability to correction in 
comparative hypotheses, render its provisional conclusions as ideas 
on the way to theories about religious matters, and demand careful 
justification for the comparative categories that make stable com- 
parative hypotheses feasible. The CRIP approach goes even further, 
however-and here the Buddhist analogy begins to strain, though 
the "egalitarian rebellion" version of the origins of Mahayana keeps 
the analogy alive. I argue that the genius insight method of com- 
parison was never sufficiently productive of deep insights and that 
such insights as were won were never made as fruitful as they might 
have been for the work of others. In short, there is a scientific 
approach to comparison that promises far better results due to the 
coordinated work of many in place of the rare, uncoordinated insights 
of the few genius comparativists. 
The question becomes, therefore, whether the CRIP method works. 
As sympathetic as I am to the criticism I have been discussing, I do 
think that more can be achieved than it allows. I return to these 
matters below. For now, the relation between the CRIP approach 
and this family of critics suggests an amusing image, flattering to 
both sides in different ways yet gently mocking both, too. What 
begins as conflicting bets over what would be gained by self- 
consciousness about method in comparison ends with the reticent, 
Theravada approach having nothing to do but watch while the enthu- 
siastic Mahayana crowd uses every available resource to maximize 
the impact of their combined efforts. The members of the disciplined 
monkish group, amazed at the innocence of their non-adept friends, 
- - 
with some justification predict that the corporate experiment will 
begin in optimistic methodological stipulations and, chaotically stum- 
bling along a host of mistake-ridden paths, end in utter failure. The 
large, noisy group, for its part, is unconcerned with the adepts' opin- 
ions because time is on its side. Where the adepts can only watch 
in amusement, already pressed hard up against their self-imposed 
limits for what is possible in comparison, the corporate experiment's 
refusal to accept any limitations a priori on what comparison can 
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achieve gives it time and opportunity to learn from its many mis- 
takes and to generate new approaches and new forms of coopera- 
tion. The outcome remains an intriguing question. I bet on the mob. 
Approaches to comparison that produce explicit cognitive represen- 
tations of the process and results of comparing religious ideas con- 
stitute a large group, though it is diverse and produces results of 
uneven quality. We can distinguish these views based on the answers 
they provide to the question about how we should justifjr the cate- 
gories used for comparison. A later section of this essay deals with 
approaches that attempt to justifjr categories directly from "similar- 
ities" in the data of religious ideas and practices; this is an extremely 
dubious procedure but it has its own special virtue, as we shall see. 
The current section deals with approaches that borrow or deduce 
categories for comparison from existing theories of religion and jus- 
ti@ the use of those categories by virtue of the plausibility they gain 
from those theories. We can distinguish such approaches, though not 
without overlap, by the nature of the theory of religion that furnishes 
and justifies the categories. I present them here for convenience in 
family groupings. 
First, one family of approaches begins from a confessional reli- 
gious perspective, approaching other religious traditions in terms of 
categories dominant within the home tradition." An important social 
phenomenon connected with this is interreligious dialogue, in which 
representatives of religious traditions join in discussion over shared 
issues of practical importance or simply to increase mutual under- 
standing. Surely this is the most natural way, in the sense of being 
simplest and most direct, to approach the task of making compar- 
isons among religious ideas. What could be more straightforward or 
more morally satisfying than to approach the plurality of religions 
from one's own perspective? I heartily affirm the moral and exis- 
tential naturalness of this kind of approach to comparison. Yet it 
" See, among numerous others, Rahner, "Christianity and the Non-Christian 
Religions," 115-1 34; Pannenberg, "Toward a Theology of the History of Religions," 
pp. 65-1 18. 
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has an obvious downside in that the categories for comparison are 
so heavily indebted to a particular confessional perspective that they 
cannot be as responsive to the data as scholars and theorists of reli- 
gion require. An ideal dialogue encounter for many religious-believer 
comparativists may not be ideal for comparativists for whose pur- 
poses the inflexibility of categories derived from and justified by con- 
fessional commitments interferes with the scholarly task. Flexible 
categories are better in the CRIP approach because comparative cat- 
egories always need improvement, and any theory that produces and 
justifies categories always needs refinement. 
Second, another family of approaches justifies the key categories 
for comparison by means of a theological-mystical-metaphysical 
theory. This is true in very different ways of the perennial philoso- 
phy,I8 various archetype and Jungian approaches,lg and even certain 
contributions in the philosophy of religion.20 The theory in question 
may be more or less complete and more or less empirically driven, 
yet it is persuasive enough to commend its principal theoretical cat- 
egories to the comparativist. There are many examples that we might 
consider here but, for the sake of specificity, I shall discuss the peren- 
nial philosophy. 
The perennial philosophy offers a way to see how adepts of all 
religious traditions hold certain key ideas in common, albeit under 
sometimes radically different descriptions, while explaining why non- 
adepts could flatly disagree with each other about religious beliefs 
and practices. The existence of this purported common core is the 
reason the perennial philosophy is sometimes called the primordial 
tradition. It is defended by thinkers who in some cases-and pre- 
eminently in the case of Huston Smith, its best known contempo- 
rary representative-have spent a great deal of time learning about 
religious practices and texts from all over the world.21 Its advocates 
would say without hesitation that its plausibility derives mainly from 
the fact that it can make sense of a great deal of data. Just because 
l 8  For example, see Huxley, Perennial Philosophy; Schuon, Transcendent Uni$ of 
Reljgions; Smith, Forgotolten Tmth. 
l9 For example, see Campbell, Ihe Masks of God Eliade, Cosmos and Hktoy; Eliade, 
Myth, Dreams, and Mys&s; Eliade, Images and Symbolr; Eliade, Sacred and the Frofane; 
Eliade, Pattenrr in Comparative Religion; Eliade, Hktoy of Rel@lcs Ideas. 
20 For example, see Hick, An Interpretation of Religion. 
2' The fruits of this research effort are especially evident in Smith, Ihe World's 
 ON. 
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of this, we are told, we should not hesitate to adopt categories from 
the perennial philosophy for the sake of making detailed compar- 
isons. From its hierarchical ontology of the Great Chain of Being 
we receive the categories of Godhead (nirguna Brahman), God (saguna 
Brahman), discarnates and other intermediate beings, human beings, 
animals, plants, and inanimate objects. Its cosmology offers categories 
such as the human condition, ultimate and proximate religious 
truth, savior figures and bodhisattvas, ignorance and liberation. Its 
view of the religious quest leads to other comparative categories such 
as morality, ritual, sacred texts, and special revelations, each of 
which is interpreted through the lens of the ontology and cosmology 
of the perennial philosophy. When a powerful large-scale theoretical 
interpretation of religion furnishes categories, perennialists urge, com- 
parison can proceed untroubled by the problem of categorial justi- 
fication, focusing instead on comparative details. Ultimately, on this 
view, the result is the further illumination and consolidation of the 
theory of religion that furnishes the categories in the first place. 
What happens, however, when some data beg for comparison in 
fundamental categories other than those served up by the perennial 
philosophy? The existence of such data is predicted within the peren- 
nial philosophy approach and explained by means of the distinction 
between what is ultimately and proximately true; in this way the 
contraindicative force of such data is contained. Ultimately, the con- 
traindicating data are really not so important even if, proximately, 
they are pervasive and central. Going further, what happens if, by 
following this procedure, most of the interesting details of religious 
practices and ideas are effectively eliminated from having a say in 
what the fundamental categories for comparison should be? For 
example, the majority of scholars in religious studies simply cannot 
accept that pervasive themes in religion such as food and purity can 
be marginalized in the way that the perennial philosophy does. As 
beautiful as the perennial philosophy is, it has few followers. This is 
partly because of an ontology that is opposed to the naturalist ten- 
dencies of modem western science but also because its handling of 
comparative data is felt to be arbitrary. The sense of arbitrariness 
derives from the fact that the theory furnishing the categories for 
comparison is too neat, too easily able to deflect objections, and thus 
too convenient, too invulnerable, too unresponsive to criticism, and 
too uninterested in correction and improvement. 
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For all that, of course, the perennial philosophy might be correct, 
at least in its essentials. The point here, however, is that the vulnera- 
bility of comparative categories is at least as important a virtue as 
the coherence and simplicity of a theological-mystical-metaphysical 
theory that might produce them. The same goes for other members 
of this family, including especially the various archetype theories of 
religion, regardless of whether we provide a metaphysical or other 
explanation for the universality of the archetypes: vulnerability of 
categories is an essential hedge against ignorance about religion and 
the wider reality in which religion exists. 
A third family of approaches justifies comparative categories by 
virtue of one or another scientific-causal theory about the origin and 
nature of religion. Such approaches, including many of the bright- 
est stars in the sky of the scientific study of religion, usually have 
begun from particular scientific or social-scientific disciplines, there- 
after leading out into proposals for more or less comprehensive the- 
ories of religion. Examples are legion, and usually emphasize a 
particular discipline such as evolutionary biology,22 an th ropo l~gy ,~~  
sociology,24 neuro~cience,'~ cognitive science,26 or psychology.27 
The word "causal" in scientific-causal is helpfully vague. O n  the 
one hand, it cuts in the direction of the second family's expectation 
that there are naturally occurring limitations on how religious ideas 
fit together. Of course, the third family explains these limitations in 
terms of the sphere of interest of the leading scientific discipline 
22 Frazer, Creation and Evolution; Frazer, The Golden Bough; Spencer Hamson, Nature 
and Realip of Religion; Tylor, Primitive Cultures. 
23 Durkheim, Elementaly F m ,  Uvi-Straus, Totemk, Uvi-Straus, Stnuturd Anthropohgv; 
Douglas, Natural Symbols; Douglas, Implicit Meanings. 
24 Weber, Rotestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber, Essays in Sociolo~;  
Weber, fi Relgion of China; Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures; Geertz, "Deep Play," 
Berger, The Sacred Canopy; Berger and Luckmann, 7?z Social Construction of Realip; 
Berger, ed., 772e Other Side of God. 
25 Jaynes, Ongtn of Conrciousness; Ashbrook, The Human Mind; d'Aquili, Laughlin, 
and McManus, The Spectrum ofRitual; d'Aquili and Newberg, "Religious and Mystical 
States," 177-99; d'Aquili and Newberg, "The Neuropsychological Basis of Religions," 
190-9 1. 
26 Boyer, Relgon Explained; Boyer, Naturalness of Religious Ideas; Wilson, Damin's 
Cathedral; Atran, In Gods We T m t .  
27 Freud, Future of an Illwion; Freud, Ciuilization and I& ficontents; Erikson, Toung 
Man Luther Rizzuto, The Birth of the Living God. 
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(e.g. social patterns, brain structure and function, psychological mech- 
anisms) rather than in the second family's more metaphysical or mys- 
tical ways. On the other hand, causation points in the direction of 
historical influence whereby certain comparative categories achieve 
a high degree of naturalness, as when the historical emergence of 
Buddhism and Hinduism from earlier Brahmanic religions means 
that samsara and mohha are natural categories for both. The histor- 
ical influences in question might vary widely, from the effects of 
trade contacts or missionary zeal to planned cultural engineering. 
Some approaches in the third family make appeal to both kinds of 
causation to justify comparative categories. This is true especially of 
approaches to comparison that allow the philosophy of history to 
play as large a role as historical details.28 Unfortunately, sometimes 
these views presuppose influence where none has been shown to 
have any historical-causal basis. Alternatively, they presuppose an 
evolution of ideas where the close-knit cultural competition needed 
for the natural selection of ideas cannot be demonstrated. 
The third family displays relatively less interest in the first fam- 
ily's approach to religious pluralism, beginning from one's personal 
religious point of view. It also contrasts with the second family by 
limiting attention to recognizably scientific theories or to historical 
causation, at least in intention if not always in practice. The prob- 
lem with the third family of approaches, however, is the same as 
the problem in the first and second families: comparative categories 
need to be more vulnerable to correction than these approaches 
allow. We must be able to take account of all that is learned about 
religious traditions in the process of making comparisons. 
It would be churlish to criticize the many instances of creative 
genius in the study of religion that abound in these three families 
of approaches. Let me be clear that in no case is it the source of 
comparative categories that troubles me. Each of these types of the- 
ories of religion has bequeathed valuable categories for comparing 
religious beliefs and practices. The problem is rather the rigidity that 
categories suffer when we justify them mainly with reference to large- 
scale theories of religion. These theorists themselves, and I daresay 
the bulk of those making use of their comparative categories, have 
not said clearly enough how these categories can respond to resis- 
Hegel, Lectures. Also see Toynbee, An Historian's Aflroach to Religon. 
COMPARING RELIGIOUS IDEAS 99 
tant data. My contention is that, regardless of the source of cate- 
gories for comparison, the methodology of comparison must prize 
vulnerability of comparative categories and of the comparisons they 
permit. 
When categories receive their justification from an existing complete 
or partial theory of religion, they are even less flexible and respon- 
sive than the theories themselves. When too much data is not reg- 
istered well enough by an array of categories, the dependence on a 
background theory makes flexible correction of categories almost 
impossible. This has long been sensed within the study of religion 
and by reaction has produced a fundamentally descriptive group of 
approaches to comparison. In this group, the justification of com- 
parative categories derives from how well they express the relative 
importance of the data and of the relations between data. 
Justification of this sort is a delicate procedure. Sometimes com- 
parativists have justified comparative categories merely on the puta- 
tively self-evident character of the similarities themselves. The failure 
of "what just seems similar" to justify categories of "the similar" is 
notorious,29 however, for two reasons. O n  the one hand, the role of 
the interpreter is so powerful in appeals to the obvious that it can 
swamp the ideal of descriptive impartiality. On  the other hand, it 
continues to be difficult to figure out when phenomena are "essen- 
tially similar"; comparison seems not to advance this phenomeno- 
logical task so much as codify persistent perplexity about it (but see 
below for a brief account of how philosophical phenomenology is 
supposed to overcome this challenge). Despite these problems, some- 
thing like an appeal to the obvious is indispensable to the justification 
of categories in these approaches because of their insistence on allow- 
ing data to speak for themselves. The problem is unavoidable, there- 
fore; it must be managed rather than avoided. I cluster the views 
- 
in this group into families based on strategies for managing the chal- 
lenge of impartiality in judging obvious similarities. 
29 This criticism is made forcefully in Smith, Imaginirg Religion. 
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First, experience and brilliance matter, and thus one family of 
approaches simply does the descriptive task well. That is to say, some 
writers adduce descriptive categories on the basis of intensive ground- 
ing in multiple religious traditions, with the benefit of ongoing dis- 
cussions with a wide variety of people. The result is descriptions of 
religious phenomena and ideas that win the grudging but secretly 
appreciative approval of large numbers of experts. Under this head- 
ing I include the luminaries of description in the study of religion. 
Some of these could be called descriptive phenomenologists of reli- 
gion, as against philosophical phenomenology to which I will return 
presently.30 For others the phenomenological label is less apt but they 
are nonetheless expert observers and describers of religious phe- 
n ~ m e n a . ~ '  There are many others of both sorts.32 There are also 
many figures from the previous sections whose projects crucially 
depend on expertise in description so it is as well to remember that 
this group is distinguished primarily by a commitment to descriptive 
adequacy as primary justification for comparative categories. 
Second, another family of approaches to comparison manages the 
problem of bias in description by partially relying on the lines of 
justification already discussed. This has to be done in precisely the 
right way, however: the aim is to relieve pressure on descriptive ade- 
quacy as the sole justification for comparative categories while still 
avoiding reliance on large-scale theories of religion in order to main- 
tain the close ties between categories and data. One example of such 
- 
a judicious hybrid approach is the comparative strategy advocated 
by Rudolf Otto in I h e  Idea of the In that work Otto blends 
phenomenological description with a partial theological viewpoint. 
There is no fully worked out theory of religion underlying Otto's 
categories of mysterium and tremendum; he himself says that he only 
30 For example, see van der Leeuw, Religion; Kristensen, n2e Meanlng ofRe1igzon; 
Jastrow, n2e Study of Religion. 
Sharpe, Comparatiue Religion; Sharpe, Understanding Rel@n; Smart, The Phommon 
of Religion; Smart, "Comparative-Historical Method," Smith, Faith and Beliej Smith, 
Towards a World Theology. 
32 One of the most pervasive suppliers and reinforcers of comparative categories 
should be mentioned under this heading, though it is less systematic than any of 
the examples so far mentioned: the almost universally used classification system of 
the United States Library of Congress. See Library of Congress Clarstjicacion Schedules 
Runchock and Droste eds. 
33 Otto, Idea of the Hob. Also relevant here are Ricoeur, n2e Symbolirm of Euil; 
Ricoeur, C o g i ~ t  of Intqpretations. 
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focuses on the irrational element in religion, which leaves out an 
enormous amount of data. Yet the categories achieve justification 
not only by observations of the recurrence of phenomena that are 
arguably identical in substance, but also by a partial worldview that 
postulates the religious potency of reality. 
Third, another hybrid family of examples uses various kinds of 
higher-order classifications of the data to supplement justification of 
comparative categories by means of their adequacy for describing 
data. Examples are plentiful, including the classification systems of 
Watson and D i l ~ o r t h ~ ~  and Paul Tillich's analysis of God concepts.35 
In such cases, structural similarities in the ideas of diverse religious 
traditions suggest a classification. This classification is then supported 
in at least one of four ways: (a) by elimination of alternative classifi- 
cations, (b) by the theoretical beauty and economy of the classification, 
(c) by the classification's efficacy in organizing further data, and (d) 
by the classification's production of new insights. These classifica- 
tions may or may not be ideal, in the sense of being defined by key 
features that are rarely realized purely in actual instances, and they 
may be partial or exhaustive. 
AU of the approaches to justifying categories discussed in this sec- 
tion prescind from heavy reliance on well worked out theories of 
religion. By contrast with the views discussed in previous sections, 
they cleave to whatever relevant data is available, without the aid 
of much in the way of a theoretical superstructure to add authority 
to the classifications and categories that result. This is so even in 
hybrid approaches to justification (the second and third families). The 
attempt to stay closer to the data by resisting the potentially blink- 
ered influence of large-scale theories is to be lauded, in spite of the 
problems of justification merely from impressions of similarity. From 
this we learn the crucial lesson that, difficult though it may be, we 
must limit (not eliminate) the role that big-deal theories of religion 
play in the justification of comparative categories. 
Yet anti-theoretical, data-driven comparison is too arbitrary, so we 
must not exclude large-scale theories of religion altogether from the 
justification of comparative categories. We must maintain a distinction- 
it can never safely be made rigid-between the task of comparison 
that produces and justifies comparative categories and the subsequent 
34 See Watson, Archite~tonics $Meaning and Dilworth, Philosophy in World Perspective. 
35 Tilich, Systmatic Thzology. 
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task of theory building that takes the categories as well-attested ways 
of organizing data. In this way we arrive at the necessity for a dialec- 
tical approach, which is the CRIP way. 
The final group of approaches to comparison attempt, by contrast 
with all approaches discussed so far, to introduce procedures that 
gradually improve categories, however they are produced. The most 
feasible procedure for such improvement is a thoroughgoing dialec- 
tic between the raw data and the categories used in making com- 
parisons of the data. These approaches tend to be unwieldy because 
of the number of variables involved. Not only is there a large amount 
of data to manage, but this data needs to be effective for the cor- 
rection of the categories in use. Moreover, the theories guiding inter- 
pretation of the data are themselves complex and subject to correction. 
I discuss here three dialectical approaches. 
The first and most famous is E. Husserl's philosophical phenom- 
e n ~ l o g y . ~ ~  Husserl's attempt to allow phenomenological generaliza- 
tions to respond to data is truly impressive. The CRIP approach 
follows him in this respect, though in few other ways. Husserl's pro- 
gram is burdened by awkward philosophical assumptions that it is 
less than optimally helpful for a general theory of comparison. In 
particular, his foundationalist epistemic project seems wrongheaded 
and produces confusions in his method that obscure the details salient 
for a general theory of comparison. His elaborate procedure for guid- 
ing phenomenological reflection is both too little in respect of attend- 
ing to too few sources of corrective wisdom, and too much in respect 
of being thoroughly overbearing and impossibly demanding. If ever 
there were a comparative method for adepts it is Husserl's. That 
said, I do admire his attempt to found a discipline of comparative 
phenomenology, his scientifically minded respect for vulnerability of 
categories inferred from data, and his use of a dialectic of data and 
categories to drive his phenomenological method. 
The second example also focuses on phenomenological reports: 
the heterophenomenological method advocated by D. C. Dennett.37 
36 Husserl, Idear, Husserl, Zhe Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. 
37 Dennett, "A Method for Phenomenology," pp. 66-98. 
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Dennett's approach can be regarded either as an attempt to correct 
some of Husserl's excesses or as a simplified version of Husserl's 
own procedures. Unfortunately, Dennett does not say enough about 
Husserl's method to enable a fair judgment of the relationship between 
the two. Suffice to say that Dennett sees clearly the philosophical 
problems associated with the comparison of phenomenological reports 
and he is as keenly aware as Husserl was of how splendid it would 
be to have a way to know when apparently different descriptions 
were really essentially about the same phenomenon. I heartily agree 
with both Dennett and Husserl in this regard. I am betting, how- 
ever, that the vision of effective comparative phenomenology will 
never be realized until neurophysiology advances to the point that 
it can make meaningful contributions to judgments about the essen- 
tial similarity and difference of the experiences giving rise to the 
phenomenological descriptions being compared.38 
The third example is the CRIP approach, summarized above.39 I 
confine myself in the next section to some comments on the mean- 
ing and significance of the dialectic between categories and data that 
the CRIP approach advocates. 
A brief excursus in the territory of philosophy of science may prove 
illuminating at this point. In the 1960's, Imre Lakatos proposed a 
fairly detailed model for the operation of the natural sciences (the 
so-called methodology of scientific research programs).40 It succeeded 
in overcoming to a significant degree the discontinuity between 
scientific work within a paradigm ("normal" science) and what Thomas 
Kuhn had identified as "paradigm shifts."*' The discontinuity had 
" For one account of how neurophysiology might make such a contribution to 
the study of religious experience, see Widman and Brothers, "A Neuropsychological- 
Semiotic Model of Religious Experiences". 
39 Also see Ultimate Realities, ch. 8, and the summary in ch. 1 of that volume. A 
fuller account is furnished in several parts of B e  Human Condition. For a more 
detailed presentation, though lacking some of the insights accrued during the CRIP 
process, see Neville, Normative Cultures. 
40 Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes". 
" Kuhn, The Structure of Sclatjfic Revolutions. 
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proved awkward because the history of science suggested on the 
whole that paradigm shifts fit into the flow of science more easily 
than Kuhn's proposal allowed. Lakatos's own proposal was also con- 
troversial, however. Though it allowed for paradigm shifts, it tended 
to make them more rational than the history of science suggested 
has been the case. The controversy between ~akatos's relatively-ratio- 
nal account of theory change and Paul Feyerabend's insistence that 
changing between scientific research programs cannot finally be given 
exhaustively rational ju~tification~~ is one of the great debates of twen- 
tieth-century philosophy of science. It appears that, although reasons 
can be given for abandoning an apparently degenerating scientific 
research program in favor of a more progressive alternative, the deci- 
sion remains a judgment call that cannot be decided completely 
rationally. 
This shows that the dialectic between data and theoretical cate- 
gories is a delicate one even in the natural sciences. Its management 
depends on having stylish good judgment about one's work, akin 
perhaps to what John Henry Newrnan called "illative sense."43 That 
is how one balances the virtues of switching to a promising new 
hypothesis that (hopefully temporarily) flies in the face of important 
data, on the one hand, and the virtues of staying with a trusted old 
hypothesis that might be more consistent with data but seems to be 
running out of predictive steam, on the other. Newman's illative 
sense is the key to efficient, potent argumentation as much as it is 
the key to making decisions between two competing hypotheses that 
each call for the investment of time and energy. This ineradicably 
artistic dimension of human reason is a sharp reminder that any 
dialectic between data and categories will be as subtle as it is complex. 
Perhaps Lakatos' most important insight was his detailed account 
of the complex path from data to theory and back again, in con- 
trast with Karl Popper's more straightforward focus on fal~ification.~~ 
In the natural sciences, data is incomprehensible apart from theo- 
ries of instrumentation, which themselves are justified both by the 
sense they make of raw data and by their derivation from active 
theories about how nature works. ~dditional essentially interpreta- 
42 Feyerabend, Against Method. 
43 Newman, An Essay in Aid of  a gram ma^ o f  Assent. 
'' Popper, irhe Logic of Scien@jic Discovq. 
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tive theories are also needed for guiding the relating of data to the- 
ory, and for picking out essential features of the gathered masses of 
data. Most important is the way that the data, already multiply inter- 
preted in these ways, can have an impact on the central hypothe- 
ses that guide the research program. No good scientist would ever 
throw over a well-tested hypothesis because of one piece of con- 
traindicating evidence. Rather, attempts would be made-frantic 
attempts, perhaps-on the one hand to test the data by replicating 
an experiment or confirming theories of instrumentation, and on the 
other hand to explain the data with an auxiliary hypothesis that 
effectively protects the central hypotheses from falsification. It is partly 
the extension of theories to new data, even to potentially threaten- 
ing data, by means of auxiliary hypotheses that helps to make research 
programs in the natural sciences seem progressive. Another sign of 
a progressive research program is its ability to predict novel facts. 
Of course, if novel facts are no longer forthcoming and explanations 
of threatening data seem contrived and merely face-saving, then the 
operative research program would be judged, sooner by its critics 
than by its advocates, to be degenerating. 
.What is true in the natural sciences is no less true in the study 
of religion: the relationship between data and theoretical terms, in- 
cluding comparative categories, is exceedingly complex.45 Most of 
the views I have discussed recognize this. Determined recognition of 
complexity is the precondition for resisting the extremes of data- 
blind enthusiasm and theory-blind confusion. This acknowledge- 
ment also involves a discriminating appreciation of similarities and 
differences among the various kinds of inquiries we see around us. The 
subject matters of religious studies are very different from those of the 
natural sciences or economics or literature. Nevertheless, Lakatos's 
methodology of research programs, when appropriately generalized, 
fairly describes the way effective inquiry works in any context from 
the natural sciences to the humanities and even to common sense 
problem solving. The same characteristics are crucial: a conservative 
approach whereby a feasible hypothesis is relinquished reluctantly, 
and a sense of adventure that prizes vulnerability to correction by 
whatever means are available given the nature of the inquiry. 
45 Lakatosian research programs have been proposed as models for the study of 
religion in Clayton, Explanation j?om Physics to Theology; and Murphy, Theology in the 
Age of Scien* Reatoniq. They are used in Wildman, Fidelio mith Plausibilio. 
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Charles Saunders Peirce, and then John Dewey, first appreciated 
the potential generality of this sort of theory of inquiry.46 Peirce actu- 
ally anticipated Lakatos in many details relevant to inquiry in the 
natural  science^.^' Peirce's more impressive achievements in this area, 
however, were his rich awareness of the complex relations between 
data and theory and his vision for extending a generalized theory 
of inquiry from the natural sciences all the way into the humanities 
and metaphysics. I share Peirce's and Dewey's basic intuition.48 I see 
no reason why the confusing data of religious beliefs and practices 
cannot be given flexible interpretative structures that render them 
able not only to inspire but also to correct theories of religion and 
of religious topics such as the human condition, ultimate realities, 
and religious truth. 
What form should such flexible interpretative structures take? They 
should take the form of the provisional conclusions of the study of 
crosscultural comparative religious ideas and practices, which is pre- 
cisely what CRIP attempted to produce. That is to say, the com- 
parative results of the CRIP effort are the first step toward a more 
effective approach to the generation and testing of theories of reli- 
gion and religious topics. The categories within which comparisons 
of religious ideas and practices take place are precisely the flexible 
means of organizing data that constructive theoretical efforts require. 
In effect, these comparative results are the analogue of theories of 
instrumentation and interpretation in the natural sciences: they allow 
theorists of religion to do better work by stabilizing data in a net- 
work of comparative categories. 
The CRIP approach thus conceives comparative categories as 
flexible interpretative structures or theories of instrumentation that 
make data available to wider theory-building efforts in religious stud- 
ies while maintaining a dialectical relationship with data that is strong 
enough to force changes in the comparative categories and in the 
theories that make use of them. This hints at the ways theorists jus- 
ti@ the comparative categories they use: justification comes both from 
the data side and from the theory side. To be more explicit about 
46 Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief," Dewey, Logic. 
'' Peirce, Essays in the Philosophy of Science. 
48 For more details on the general theory of inquiry suggested here, see Wildman, 
"The Resilience of Religion in Secular Social Environments". 
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this, I offer the following parsing of the task of justifjrlng compara- 
tive generalizations. 
Each part of the task of justifjrlng comparative categories corre- 
sponds to an impulse present in one or more of the approaches to 
comparison that I have discussed in this essay. Coordination of these 
lines of justification is essential, as is remembering that we speak 
here of justifjrlng categories for comparing religious ideas. There needs 
to be (a) a delimiting of possibilities whereby the ideas of interest 
within a comparative category are set in a wider framework of plau- 
sible religious ideas of the same sort, so as not to overlook vital alter- 
natives; (b) an account of the dynamic logical connections among 
these various possible ideas so that the category is specified not merely 
by a list of ideas but also by relationships among the ideas them- 
selves; (c) a genetic analysis of specific symbolic representations of 
these religious ideas, so that historical influences among ideas and 
social-cultural influences on the origins of the ideas are explicit; and 
(d) analyses of the circumstances that accompany the key shifts in 
symbolic representation during the history of the religious ideas within 
the category. If all four of these theory-side lines of justification are 
accomplished convincingly, with no detection of excessive arbitrari- 
ness or distortion, then we will have good reason to think, from the 
- 
theory side at least, that our comparative category is doing useful 
work. To these theory-side considerations we must add the basic 
phenomenological point on the data side, namely, that (e) our sense 
of what is similar, when carefully conditioned by scrupulous prepa- 
ration and exposure to many variations, really should count as par- 
tial justification of comparative categories. 
These five requirements for justifjrlng comparative categories draw 
on standard commitments within the history of religions, the phi- 
losophy of religion, and the phenomenology of religion. I shall list 
those debts more formally below. They are the tests by which we 
determine whether comparative categories organize the data well and 
thus whether the categories themselves are adequate. It is perfectly 
clear that these tests are theoretical endeavors related to the larger 
- 
theories of religion and of religious themes for which comparative 
categories serve as the organizers and mediators of relevant data. 
With all of those lines of explanation and justification in place, the 
CRIP approach to comparison leads out in interesting directions: to 
the birth of systematic comparative metaphysics; to a strengthened, 
potentially progressive, multidisciplinary investigation of religious phe- 
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nomena; to a more unified approach to the scientific study of reli- 
gion that coordinates the typically more isolated disciplines of the 
history of religion, the phenomenology of religion, and the philoso- 
phy of religion; and to a particular view of pedagogy in religious 
studies. 
CRIP was primarily concerned with the preliminary task of orga- 
nizing data by means of categories for comparison in a complex 
dialectical process-precisely as complex as the formation of a com- 
munity of inquiry from differently-minded scholars, including spe- 
cialists and generalists. There were forays into more adventurous 
theoretical efforts but that is secondary. The categories used were 
shamelessly begged, borrowed, or stolen from multiple sources, includ- 
ing early translations of sacred texts, many of the various sources 
mentioned in earlier sections of this essay, and the creative intuition 
of project members. Comparison always begins in the middle of data- 
processing. Yet the CRIP effort also actively sought ways to correct 
comparative categories in an effort to organize the data of religious 
ideas in the most natural, efficacious ways. In fact, it adopted a 
promiscuous attitude to correction, excluding a priori no source of 
potential wisdom, grading sources according to their actual fruitful- 
ness for making data relevant to the refinement of the comparative 
categories and the comparisons they permit. The three CRIP vol- 
umes are a kind of test: if the primary task of comparison has gone 
well enough, then we will have good reason to think that flexible 
structuring of the wild data of religious ideas is possible and that a 
more critical and data-aware form of theory building ought to be 
possible. 
By way of summarizing the CRIP approach, I recite a list of debts 
and corrections to existing comparative approaches. First, compara- 
tivists borrowing categories from existing theories are exercising a 
kind of wisdom. They are backing categories that are at least par- 
tially attested by the theory that gives them meaning and they seek 
in that way to extend the core theory itself to new tracts of data. 
That is why I can admire the perennial philosophers' dogged adher- 
ence to their interpretation of the world religions. Without fidelity 
to core hypotheses, even sometimes to the point of arbitrary han- 
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dling of data, we will almost certainly overlook some special virtue 
of the core hypothesis. Such devotion to research programs is vital 
to the stability of interpretative theories. Without stability, vulnera- 
bility for the sake of progressive correction is impossible. From these 
laborers in our vineyards we can learn to take good categories from 
wherever we find them and to be unafraid of the need for persis- 
tence in testing any theory of religion against data. However, we 
will still seek a fairer and more flexible approach to the data itself. 
Second, comparativists that refuse to make explicit the categories 
in respect of which they make comparisons could well be exercising 
another kind of wisdom. In this case it is the recognition that ana- 
logues of scientific theories of instrumentation do not exist in the 
study of religion to any great degree, at least not yet. Thus, they 
prefer moving gracefully among the forest of data to trying to map 
and regulate the data's wildness for the sake of evaluating its force 
for or against the particular interpretations of it implied in the explicit 
use of comparative categories. From these fellow workers we can 
learn not to underestimate the complexity and disarray of the data 
of religious studies. It may be, however, that we can develop within 
the scientific study of religion decent analogues for data-handling 
theories of instrumentation in the sciences. 
Third, comparativists who try to maximize the virtue of empiri- 
cism in generating comparative categories from data are wisely rec- 
ognizing that there must be some degree of self-conscious distance 
between the comparative task and the task of larger theory building 
in religious studies. From them we can learn that categories are a 
middle-level beast. They help to organize data for the sake of big- 
deal theory construction yet they derive their justification as much 
from their polished data management as from the theories that use 
them. However, I remain sharply aware of the problem pointed out 
by J. Z. Smith of justifying comparative categories on the basis of 
apparent similarities in data.49 The CRIP solution to this problem 
is the four theory-side criteria for justifying~omparative categories 
in conjunction with an affirmation on the /data side of the useful- 
ness of phenomenological intuition of respects of similarity and 
difference, though only when the phenomenological imagination is 
49 See Smith, 1maginih.g Religion. 
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properly prepared. I reaffirm Peirce's insistence that categories derived 
from theory for classifying data need to be checked against inde- 
pendent phenomenological analyses of the data to determine their 
~uitability.~' 
Fourth, in addition to the important critique of intuitions of sim- 
ilarity just mentioned, J. Z. Smith also argues that, at the date of 
his writing, there was no approach to comparison that produces or 
discovers, as against constructs, compari~ons,5~ and further that there 
was no satisfactory approach to comparison under discussion any- 
where.52 I agree on the second point but demur, slightly, with regard 
to the first. In Smith's language, nobody "has presented rules for 
the production of" discoveries in the domains of the natural sciences 
either, yet discoveries happen. Moreover, the insights of well-trained 
describers and comparers of religions can be novel, at times, and 
those insights can transcend the level of the flimsy associative con- 
nections that Smith rightly attacks. I agree, however, that discovery 
occurs too rarely. The scarcityjis because it is so difficult to acquire 
the competence that makes novel insights also profound ones. The 
CRIP proposal helps by requiring less the genius of comparative 
adepts than the scrupulous hard work of ordinary expert compara- 
tivists. Many of the novel ideas that can be put into the dialectic of 
categories and data that CRIP described and enacted may turn out 
to be of little use; certainly the project disposed of a lot more cat- 
egories than it kept. Similarly, some categories and comparisons may 
never achieve the multi-faceted justification on which CRIP insisted; 
it surely is a demanding five-fold standard for justification, after all. 
We can fairly describe those categories that do make the grade as 
profound, however, and in at least some cases, novel. After that, dis- 
covery is a matter of learning to look for what worked elsewhere in 
new situations, tentatively extending the reach of data-management 
that the web of comparative categories enables, and always seeking 
for the kinds of dissonance that should force revisions. The CRIP 
approach answers Smith's call for a comparative method that can 
escape the weakness of extant approaches. 
50 On this mater, see the discussions in Neville, ed., 77u Human Condition, chs. 
1-2; and Neville, Nonnative Cultures, pp. 74-84. 
51 Smith, Imagini7g Religion, p. 2 1. 
52 Smith, Imagining Relgion, p. 25. 
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Finally, I also take seriously the alternatives to explicit method- 
ologies of comparison discussed above by trying to incorporate their 
strengths into the corrective procedures of the proposed approach. 
This is present, for example, in the way that theoretical justifications 
for categories help to deconstruct assumptions about what seems 
obvious. Moreover, judgments of similarity, for all their dangers, can 
call forth theoretical efforts of justification-and all this for the sake 
of fidelity to the data. Nevertheless, the CRIP approach is explicit 
about the categories and the provisional results of comparisons. Here 
I enter my wager in favor of the loosely coordinated march of many 
feet, all contributing to the task of generating and improving com- 
parative hypotheses. This bet includes the gamble that the chaos will 
in time yield to something more like the organized frenzy of the 
natural and social sciences. I do see reasons to think that such a 
transformation in comparative religion will be difficult. After all, the 
forging of the CRIP community of inquiry was a demanding, drawn- 
out process.53 And then there are the intimate existential entangle- 
ments that link comparativists to their subject matters in ways that 
do not occur, say, for physical chemists. That is the nature of reli- 
gion: its study is often profoundly self-referential. These difficulties 
notwithstanding, I see no reasons to think that my bet on the future 
- 
of the CRIP apprwch to comparison must necessarily lose. O n  the 
contrary, especially because of its promise for aiding a more criti- 
cal, data-aware era of theory-building in the scientific study of reli- 
gion and comparative theology, we have every reason to be hopeful. 
The pedagogical implications of all this are now close to the sur- 
face. The CRIP approach absolutely demands a community of inquiry 
that stabilizes comparative judgments for investigation, capitalizes on 
diverse insights and types of expertise, and introduces novices into 
procedures and habits of thinking that facilitate effective comparison 
of religious ideas. In fact, the CRIP project was explicitly designed 
with these pedagogical considerations in mind. The four-year effort 
53 See the appendices to each of the volumes of the CRIP project for my account 
of the CRIP process. 
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funded one comparative-religion graduate student for each of the six 
tradition-specialists involved in the project. These students observed 
the roughly two hundred hours of in-meeting conversation and debate 
among the six specialists and four generalists, and participated more 
and more freely as time passed. They had formal opportunities to 
present their ideas and in some cases they became co-authors with 
the specialists on papers for the project's publications. They gave us 
feedback on the dynamics of the community-formation process and 
commented on what about the project's approach seemed to work 
and what did not. In this way, these fortunate students were initi- 
ated into a community of scholarship whose values were coopera- 
tion and mutual respect, and whose mission was the identification 
and ruthless criticism of candidate comparative categories for mak- 
ing comparisons among the vital ideas of the world's religions. 
The aim of initiation expresses the distinctive contribution of the 
CRIP approach to pedagogy in religious studies. Of course, in one 
sense, all scholarly learning is initiation into ways of thinking, key 
literatures, and disciplinary meta-questions of method and value. 
Initiation means something more concrete in the case of the CRIP 
approach to comparison, however, because the community of inquiry 
is indispensable. Thus, initiation is not just learning the ropes and 
sails, after which the student can go off sailing by him or herself. It 
must also mean accepting a place within a community of investiga- 
tion that has differentiated roles and a common goal. It means being 
apprenticed not just in a specialty with its languages and literatures, 
but also in general theoretical issues in the study of religion, in the 
philosophy of comparison, and in both the theory-oriented and data- 
oriented aspects of the task of justifying comparative categories. It 
means committing to an ideal of scientific comparison for which 
mutual reliance and information sharing are crucial. 
This understanding of initiation into a community of inquiry makes 
sense in the context of students capable of research so long as there 
is a real community devoted to comparison in which the study can 
materially participate. This happened in the CRIP project but it 
does not always happen for graduate students in comparative reli- 
gion. Like doctoral students in most fields, they are often alone in 
their work, and up to a point this is inevitable and good. But the 
ideal of participation in a community of inquiry is unhelpfully abstract 
when the community can only be imagined. Graduate programs in 
religion should strive to cultivate a working community of inquirers, 
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and possibly (as happened in the CRIP project) an intentional com- 
munity of inquiry with a concrete goal. These differently equipped 
inquirers should learn not only their specialties but also the classic 
works in comparative religion and the central methodological debates 
that arc across and through its various disciplines. This is how stu- 
dents become bonded together despite their differences and the dis- 
ciplinary fights they study. 
At the undergraduate level, initiation begins as introduction. There 
is an enormous amount of raw information to grasp in introductory 
religion classes. I do not pretend that many novices in comparative 
religion can meaningfully participate in any community of inquiry 
capable of making corporate headway on problems of identikng, 
testing, and justifying comparative categories and producing com- 
parisons of religious ideas by means of these categories. For religious 
studies majors, however, something approximating the graduate stu- 
dent's experience of initiation into a working community of inquiry 
should be possible in the later years of a degree program, particu- 
larly through seminars devoted to in-depth discussion of a particu- 
lar theme or problem in religious studies. 
The most perplexing problem facing all of these pedagogical rec- 
ommendations is the fractured state of the community of religious 
studies scholars. This slightly desperate situation makes constructing 
actual working groups of comparativists more difficult than it should 
be, and calls for significant social engineering efforts. As long as com- 
parativists want to work only with ideologically like-minded colleagues, 
the kind of community that the CRIP was and calls for will remain 
rare. Scholars of religious studies themselves need to initiate each 
other into the central tasks and problems of comparative religion, 
even if this means reaching uncomfortably beyond the narrow confines 
of their disciplinary specializations. The discomfort was visceral for 
the CRIP working group and the community obligations exhaust- 
ing, at times. Yet the group achieved what no one member could 
achieve alone, despite individual brilliance. This is the heart of the 
CRIP approach to comparison: we can do more and better by work- 
ing together. 
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